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Philosophy and its Other
This paper is about the opposition between narrative and philosophy, two
distinct discursive practices that have historically been defined as being at
odds with one another since the inception of Greek philosophy as rational
discourse. Within our own narrative of the history of Western philosophy,
we trace this opposition back to the pre-Socratic celebration of reason over
myth, at which point, according to this account, primitive or naive narra-
tive explanations of phenomena were supplanted by the dialectic of reason.
“Man” began to ask the abstract “what is ...” question in lieu of the previ-
ous narrative “who is...” question. Socrates became the namesake for this
philosophical tradition and banished the epic poets from the Republic be-
cause they failed to embrace the ideal of reason. Stories, Plato argued, threat-
ened rational discourse because they were grounded in the mess of the par-
ticular, whereas philosophy aspired to generality and universal truths. Nar-
rative was seen as limited by its univocal aspect, its need for a telling and a
listening. It was temporally located in the present, with emphasis on dis-
tinct personal incidents of the past, and was therefore caught up in unique
life histories, all too particular for those needing the certainty of a universal
truth. Derrida (1993) argues that philosophy needs to define itself against
this other—narrative—so as to affirm its own centrality and necessity. Philo-
sophical discourse, according to Derrida, is dependent on this other dis-
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course precisely because it must exclude the specificity of stories so as to
claim for itself knowledge of universals.
The feminist philosopher, Adriana Cavarero (2000) uses Greek tragedy
to show that the opposition between narrative and philosophy is always an
enactment of gender relations. She claims that the exclusion or suppression
of narrative, to which Derrida refers, is implicated in the exclusion of the
feminine from the discourse of philosophy:
In other words, the tragedy of the originary scission between the universal
man and the uniqueness of the self, between the abstraction of the subject
and the concreteness of the uniqueness—in a word, between the discur-
sive order of philosophy and that of narration—is an entirely masculine
tragedy...The discourse on the universal, with its love of the abstract and
its definitory logic, is always a matter for men only. (pp. 52–53)
The feminine, according to Cavarero, is discursively constituted as the con-
crete, the particular, the narratable self, that Other which philosophy seeks
to redeem through the universal. She is not essentializing the feminine, but
rather historicizing it within the tradition of “rational discourse”. Gender
and power relations are thus enacted through the continual re-establish-
ment of this discursive opposition between narrative and reason.
This paper attempts to disrupt the binary between these two discursive
practices, and to examine the ways in which gender figures in the contin-
ued re-construction of the binary, by exploring the lived experience of a
female high school philosophy teacher in a same sex school. I have used a
narrative format so as to problematize the primacy of philosophical dis-
course, and as a means of depicting the subtle ways in which gender is
inscribed onto/through the structuring of this discursive opposition. The
narrative is crafted as a series of fragments which shift the focus back and
forth between classroom incidents to journal entries to biographical infor-
mation. The result is a more polyvocal text that playfully explores different
perspectives. Crafting the narrative into a fiction in this way fronts its
textuality or fabrication, and in doing so, compounds the problem faced by
philosophy when it confronts narrative.
I ask that the reader use this narrative as a literary piece that invites
speculation on the intersections between epistemology, gender, and histori-
cal context, and as a teacher’s story that aims to generate debate as to how
these three discursive frames produce (and are produced by) specific in-
stances of pedagogy. My hope is that this text might be used as a teaching
tool in pre-service social science method courses in order to facilitate dis-
cussion around teacher identity and the re-contextualizing of knowledge
into life history frames, and recursively, the embedding of life history into
knowledge frames. The juxtaposition of narrative and philosophical dis-
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course is intended to breach the binary that sustains their opposition by
locating and documenting the lived experience of that same opposition.
The narrative also seeks to expose some of the dissonance experienced by
teachers in a post-foundational world of dialogic meaning where pedagogies
of discomfort seem to be the best strategy for disrupting the Socratic har-
nessing of knowledge. Boler and Zembylas (2003) describe the emotional
labour involved in a “pedagogy of discomfort” through which both stu-
dents and educators learn to embrace the vulnerability of ambiguity (p.
129). They point to the assemblage of “vulnerability and hope, labor and
passion, anger and self-discovery” (p. 130) that emerge in the critical en-
counter between teacher and student. The story included here is a testa-
ment to that emotional and embodied experience of a teacher struggling to
devise a means of sustaining the provisional sense of learning as “becom-
ing” in such a way that she honours the personal and political complexity
of the context. In order to model that purpose in the very structure of the
narrative, I have used a series of fragments that resist closure, disrupting
the reader’s comfort, interrupting any illusion of mastery, so as to play with/
in the limits of telling such stories, and to push the limits of my own inten-
tions.
For those wanting more substantial scaffolding, I offer the following as
a set of guiding questions, not to be used as “what is...” questions that aim
for generalizable answers, but rather used as catalysts and triggers that might
encourage one to perform the suggested act upon the text—to interfere with
it in a more structured way. Each of the three categories offers a set of in-
structions that are intended to help the reader identify the crafted or fabri-
cated nature of the text. I have included them here in order to assist in the
use of the narrative as a teaching tool, however, I realize there may be read-
ers who find them too prescriptive, and I encourage these readers to set
aside the instructions and pursue the unique particularity of a reading in-
formed by nothing other than a “who is ...” question.
(1) Epistemology: How does the re-storying of epistemology breach its claim
to universality?
Find the references to theories of knowledge and compare these in
terms of the binary between philosophical discourse and narrative. Ex-
amine the verbs used in relation to reading philosophy. Look for meta-
phors that suggest bodily encounters between ideas.
(2) Gender: List the places where gender is enacted and name the way it is
positioned with respect to power relations. Scrutinize the depictions of
the female students for signs of gender. Note the use of pronouns in the
various biographical anecdotes. Why are all the men angry?
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(3) Historical Context: Identify the specific points in the narrative when a
philosophical idea is re-contextualized. Describe the ways in which this
re-contextualizing alters its meaning.What is lost in these instances?
What is gained? To what end?
Who She Was When She Knew
The instructor Holly arrives late, as usual. She feels agitated, restless, moving
quickly into the margins of the classroom where her desk is tucked away,
almost hidden, and from where she can watch the students without their
knowing. She pauses momentarily. She can feel the growing anticipation with
each moment, the learned-waiting for a well-delivered lesson. A sense of frus-
tration and regret clouds her thoughts as she realizes that she too must have
contributed to their sedate expectancy. She remembers the first few classes
when she established her expertise and thereby demoted their active voices.
She walks amongst them and distributes the following quote from
Nietzsche (1976):
There are no educators. As a thinker, one should speak only of self-educa-
tion. The education of youth by others is either an experiment, conducted
on one as yet unknown and unknowable, or a leveling on principle, to
make the new character, whatever it may be, conform to the habits and
customs that prevail: in both cases, therefore, something unworthy of the
thinker—the work of parents and teachers, whom an audaciously honest
person has called nos ennemis naturels. (p. 70)
She wonders whether to anchor the aphorism with a teacher explanation,
or risk saying nothing. She hopes that at least one student will make copies
and paste the irreverent Nietzsche in all the bathroom stalls. She is encour-
aged by their look of engagement with the textual fragment. She wants them
to make her vulnerable. She wants them to use Nietzsche against her. She
needs to use a cult figure like Nietzsche, with a certain mystique amongst
high school students, to de-center her own authority. She is unsure as to
whether this invitation to radically subvert her authority actually robs the
students of their power to dismiss her. She wonders if she has simply re-
positioned herself in some other safely ensconced epistemic location.
She watches as the students turn the little scrap paper over to see if
there is more on the other side.
“That’s a bit juvenile,” suggests one student, crumpling up her fore-
head and crossing her outstretched legs, “The truth is that I learn more from
tv than I do from my parents and my teachers.” She leaves her mouth slightly
open and stares at Holly, waiting for the response. Holly’s fantasy of
Nietzsche triggering an act of civil disobedience within the all-female and
highly obedient student population is suddenly dashed.
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Holly never read Nietzsche during adolescence, although her closest
male friends did. They all liked his radical rejection of culturally sanctioned
truths. Instead she read Plato. Lots of Plato. She found Nietzsche too dis-
missive, and she worried that his rants appealed all too easily to boys and
Nazis. She didn’t want to impose her juvenile reading onto his adult an-
guish. She denied herself Nietzsche, saving him for later. Poor Nietzsche
would never have approved of such righteous self-denial, but perhaps he
would have endorsed her self-subversion years later as a high school phi-
losophy teacher.
She glances at the clock and decides to begin the lesson. They are study-
ing knowledge. The nature of knowledge. They began with basic analytical
questions: How do you know what you know? What is the difference be-
tween information and knowledge? Are the emotions always involved in
the act of knowing? What do you know best? What is ignorance? The course
is structured around ideas and also around the history of philosophy. They
have recently traced Western epistemology back to Plato.
“We are currently in the cave,” says Holly, in reference to the excerpt
from Plato’s Republic, “shackled and blinded by our ignorance. We perceive
only appearances and know nothing about the true essence of reality.”
One student yawns. Another demands access to reality (after raising
her hand), “the desk is a desk. It’s a wooden desk. I know that.”
Holly counters, “Perhaps the desk is actually a collection of bumbling
atoms and fuzzy electrons,” she smiles, “Perhaps our perceptual skills are
so weak, our ignorance so deep, that we don’t see the true desk, we see only
the wooden desk.” She walks towards an empty desk at the front of the class
and pauses beside it, wondering if the absent student has skipped class.
Another student, with more invested in the classroom and its reality,
reacts emotionally to Holly’s provocation, “My friendship with Lisa is real.
It has to be,” she announces. Holly, fascinated by the spontaneous turn from
material object to social relation, from neutral observation to normative de-
mand, reflects on the profound webbing of identity in an all female high
school. In her journal, she remembers her own youth:
I remember suspecting that my very being was completely accidental and
unnecessary. At sixteen, I imagined that my own identity was a series of
self-generated portraits, all equally plausible, equally inauthentic; all in
conflict. I spoke derisively about naive people who actually thought they
possessed a centered constant self that endured through time. (Holly’s jour-
nal, May, 2001)
She read Plato’s Republic in her first university philosophy course. The young
professor frequently showed his frustration with the apparent lack of rigour
during classroom discussion. He appreciated Holly’s fine honed analytic
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mind and asked her out for drinks. She said no, instinctively, without hesi-
tation. She remembered later in class, when she expressed self-doubt about
her understanding of some issue, like human will or freedom, he replied,
“Socrates is interested in friendships and relationships. In why we enter
into them. Or don’t. That is your freedom.”
I loved Socrates, despite all his foibles. He was so determined to under-
mine the pat truisms of his compatriots. He was the consummate teacher, I
thought, always earnest and prudent. I imagined him as the embodiment
of intellectual commitment. And although I knew better even then, I was
nonetheless intrigued by his image of a utopian society where children
were taken from their mothers at birth and given an education according
to their ability. The entire system aspired to such a perfect ideal of rea-
soned culture. (Holly’s journal, May, 2001)
She assigns The Last Days of Socrates. Each group selects one of the four
dialogues which recount the incidents leading to the trial and the suicide.
She brings in a colour laserprint copy of Jacque Louis-David’s The Death of
Socrates, in which the bearded sage raises the cup of hemlock to his mouth,
surrounded by his distraught and loyal pupils. Despite the fact that it is
Plato’s account that is most famous (although there are other dialogues on
the incident recorded by other devout followers), there is some suspicion as
to whether Plato was even present at the trial and death of Socrates. None-
theless, he is present in the painting, his face buried forlornly in his white
robe, while the wailing wife and her attendants are seen exiting the scene,
having been asked to leave so that Socrates might share his last moments
with his thinking male friends.
“Why doesn’t he just take the banishment option? He didn’t have to
take his own life. They gave him a way out.” asks a student.
“But was it an option he could take? To be silenced?” Holly asks, per-
haps too aggressively. “In taking his own life, he became a martyr. He made
reason a martyr, sacrificed by the mob rule of Athenian democracy.” She
thinks maybe she has said too much. Demos versus reason. Democracy ver-
sus geometry. Is she really willing to develop this notion in a school that
once dedicated itself to preparing young ladies for service and marriage?
“You mean he’s had more impact this way because we read him in
school?” asks the same student.
“And more. Think of how we rank analytic and deductive reasoning
above story telling and poetry. Think of how logic defines the borders of
intelligence. Think of how your future success at university depends on
your mimicking his dialectic of question and answer. Think of...” she stalls,
unable to bear the burden of a pedagogy that teaches but cannot explain
how it teaches. She wants to destabilize the structures of foreclosure, to
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cultivate a kind of rigorous disorientation, to practice a pedagogy of dis-
comfort. She distributes a second Nietzsche (1976) quote:
When one finds it necessary to turn reason into a tyrant, as Socrates did, the
danger cannot be slight that something else will play the tyrant...the fa-
naticism with which all Greek reflection throws itself upon rationality be-
trays a desperate situation; there was danger, there was but one choice:
either to perish or- to be absurdly rational. (p. 478)
Holly’s father was devoted to the ideal of rational discourse. He was dog-
matic about reason. He believed in its power to emancipate. Her mother, as
a means of defining the extremes, played the melancholic artist. They were
both drinkers. Disputes often led to plate smashing. They lived the binary
between art and science. Holly was trapped in between. Many of her life
decisions have been in the wake of this conflict. She wonders about the
ways in which she brings that personal history of opposition into her class-
room.
Who am I to question their certainty of feelings? Why do I get to play pro-
vocateur? Who elected me to disrupt the status quo? Suddenly I am their
enemy, struggling against their established order, but only as a way of deal-
ing with my own personal resistance. (Holly’s journal, June, 2001)
Holly hates the textbook with an irrational passion. It offers students pat
formulaic versions of various philosophical positions without ever
historicizing its own reading. The author dwells almost maliciously on the
irony of Socratic self-denial and ignorance, as though pleased to propagate
the notion that the teacher always and ultimately knows better.
“Do you think Socrates is being ironic?” she asks the class. They say
nothing, unwilling to impart intention to Socrates. Holly wonders why they
are so quiet. “When Socrates says he is ignorant, does he really mean that?
Or is he feigning ignorance so that the other discussants will feel free to
make proposals?” She waits but the students continue to hold back. “Does
he interrogate wise men because he hopes that they will shed light on the
nature of reality? Or is he out to disturb the comfort stories of those who are
established and wrongly considered wise? Is he just a shit-disturber?”
Holly takes her students to a public philosophy lecture at the univer-
sity. The hall is almost empty. She scans the meager audience of graduate
students and professors. She sits surrounded by her own students, proud
that she is a high school philosophy teacher. The speaker is a highly distin-
guished classics scholar who uses a dense academic vocabulary. Her stu-
dents listen without understanding. His lecture is about Socratic irony. She
begins taking notes, the consummate good student, eager to learn from the
expert. He offers a historical re-reading of Socrates, citing Roman commen-
taries that ridiculed readers who imposed irony as a way of white-washing
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what they disagreed with. The lecture ends with a humble request that our
interpretations be carefully hermeneutic and self-consciously historical, and
that our current reading of Socratic irony, our possible projection of irony,
be understood through our own cultural proclivity towards irony. Holly
leaves the lecture determined to disrupt the textbook.
Holly’s past experiences as a philosophy student had a direct impact on
her future teacher identity. When Holly began studying philosophy as a
graduate student, she wanted to be in conversation with all of the dead
white men who had contributed to the canon. She took up with Kant and
Husserl and other system builders, thinking she owed the tradition a care-
ful reading from origin onwards. She enrolled in a seminar course on
Wittgenstein in which the class studied, line by line, word by word, the
little enigmatic Tractatus. The book seemed to demand interpretation. They
dissected its every nuance, interpreting the slightest pause as evidence of
counter-meanings. She spent hours dwelling on details, reflecting on the
imagery within the system. She wrote myopic little papers on the meaning
of one sentence or word. It was as though the seriousness of this perfect
little book, which was bereft of context and metaphysics, allowed no room
for play. She remembers gravely and earnestly inquiring into the intentions
of the author. She wanted to locate him, to situate him in a context and
understand his story. She was the only woman in the seminar, as would be
the case in the seminar on his Philosophical Investigations, and she remem-
bered being highly conscious of her singularity and her disruption of
sameness. Late in the term she bravely and brazenly asked about
Wittgenstein’s understanding of historical consciousness. The professor
suffered from Parkinson’s which caused him to shake and tremble through-
out each seminar. He replied gruffly, brushing off the suggestion that
Wittgenstein would countenance any such understanding as relevant.
I couldn’t help but imagine Wittgenstein’s almost allergic reaction to Hegel,
his personal fear of eros and touch, his utter frustration as a teacher in a
rural schoolhouse teaching logic and chess to a select few, and then lashing
the knuckles of those who couldn’t or wouldn’t learn. I sensed the exhaust-
ing idealism in every proposition. So much anger and tragic self-denial. So
profound the need to retreat from others. I wonder if a sense of self-care
might have eased his burden. For despite the shift in his later philosophy,
he never seemed to embrace his own lived experiences. (Holly’s journal,
July, 2001)
She sits comfortably on the empty student desk and recounts the famous
anecdote: “Wittgenstein was at Cambridge when Popper was invited to
give a lecture on some famous philosophical problem.” She swings her legs
under the desk like a pendulum. The students listen for the familiar devel-
opment of a narrative. “Wittgenstein made dismissive noises throughout
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the lecture, and afterward he approached Popper and angrily brandished a
fire poker, adamantly shouting, “there are no philosophical problems, only
puzzles!” She laughs loudly. The students seem to enjoy her laughter. “This,
of course, was well after he had abandoned the regime of the Tractatus. He
may have even had a lover at the time, although never openly.”
As a student, Holly discovered the pleasure of reading philosophers
who were critical of the analytic tradition. She gave up on her linear acqui-
sition of all the “forefathers” and their systems, and embraced those who
tore down the structures, those who followed in the footsteps of Nietzsche.
I lay on the grass, under a tree, outside the vine-covered university build-
ing. My eyes shifted from the page I was reading, out across the manicured
lawn and up the mottled stone of academia. The Archaeology of Knowledge
was challenging and strange and unlike anything I had read before. Fou-
cault seemed intent on undoing discursive authoritative knowledge. I reso-
nated with his desire for disruption. I enjoyed his sustained attempt to
defraud our cultural meta-narratives. I knew that my reading him there on
the grass outside the ivy-covered building was a catalytic moment carved
into my own personal granite. (Holly’s journal, June, 2001)
She read everything by Foucault. She immersed herself in his writing style.
She became intimate with him in ways that she could never be with
Wittgenstein. She admired his rigorous genealogies and his grand sweep-
ing observations. But it was the detailed depictions of particular events,
and the commitment to tell the stories of individuals, that she found most
engaging. She felt the power of his writing long before she truly realized
that he was writing about power.
“Plato seeks to know the eternal changeless forms, not just the appear-
ances, the phantasms, the mere beliefs to which we, in our embodied mis-
conceptions, hold true.” Holly revisits Plato’s text, testing the limits of her
students commitment to the binary of representation, eager to dismantle
the dialectic of absence and presence.
“So when Socrates says he’s ignorant, is he referring to his ignorance of
the ideal forms?” asks a student.
“Once you’ve unshackled yourself,” begins another student, “and re-
moved yourself from the cave, do you automatically come to know the ideal
forms?”
“Let’s step back for a moment,” suggests Holly, “and ask ourselves why
someone might structure our understanding in terms of a two-tiered sys-
tem of appearances and their objective source. How does it serve Socrates
to use this model? Or rather, how does it serve Plato, the author of the text?
Don’t forget: This is Plato’s version of Socrates. Think about how Socrates
is able to tease out the assumptions of his opponent, to show how these
beliefs are grounded in the particularity of their perspective, and finally to
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reveal how these fail to be generalizeable or universally true. He uses his
dialectic of question and answer to demote the local differences that distin-
guish one person from another. As a means of establishing hierarchies of
meaning and significance, it works beautifully at demoting the details of
lived experience. It silences any dissenting voices. It erases the particular
and the personal.”
We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialecti-
cally. (Foucault, 1977, p. 186)
Holly wants to subvert Platonism. She wants to pervert its purity. She wants
to convert her philosophy lesson into a sustained historical analysis of the
dirtiness of ideas. Her eyes move searchingly from student to student dis-
persed across the array of desks. She wonders if they are feeling some dis-
comfort at hearing her suggestions. An all female private school, a privi-
leged elite community. She wonders if she will be offered banishment when
the administration discovers that she is trashing Plato.
To convert Platonism (a serious task) is to increase its compassion for real-
ity, for the world, and for time. To subvert Platonism is to begin at the top
(the vertical distance of irony) and to grasp its origin. To pervert Platonism
is to search out the smallest details, to descend (with the natural gravita-
tion of humour) as far as its crop of hair or the dirt under its fingernails—
those things that were never hallowed by an idea; it is to discover its initial
decentering in order to recenter itself around the Model, the Identical, and
the Same; it is the decentering of oneself with respect to Platonism so as to
give rise to the play (as with every perversion) of surfaces at its border.
(Foucault, 1977, p. 168)
“I don’t understand,” says the student who demanded access to reality,
“there are no ideal forms? no absolute truths? Just strategies for manipulat-
ing people? That’s too depressing.”
“Besides,” says Lisa, whose friendship is real, “what does that make of
you, as the teacher?”
In the Meno, Socrates asks the young slave boy to take a stick and draw
the geometric figures in the sand. He interrogates the boy using a series of
questions that coerce him into acknowledging his mistaken beliefs. All
Socratic dialogues move through this naive certainty into acknowledged
ignorance. Then he plays the midwife and facilitates in the boy’s “recollec-
tion” of the Pythagorean relation. Squares and lengths are doubled until
the generality of the theorem is perceived. The entire scene is witnessed by
the slave owner. Socrates argues that he has not taught the boy anything.
The interrogation reveals what the boy already knows. The interrogation
reveals that teaching is impossible, because knowledge of truths is always
already known. Sharon Todd (2003) remarks that, “Socrates is the teacher,
who, like the perfect murderer, makes it appear that teaching has not taken
71
(Dis)locating Gender Within the Universal
ELIZABETH DE FREITAS
place, who leaves the scene without a trace, and who, moreover, is con-
vinced of his own innocence” (p. 24).
Holly asks her students to apply the same experiment to some small
unsuspecting child in their neighborhood. When they return to class, one
student recounts the story of her attempt to do so. The story captivates the
others because of its unpredictable nature. “I tried it on my little sister, but
she cried and cried,” says the student, “she kept picking up handfuls of
sand and letting it stream through the cracks between her fingers. The lines
I had drawn in the sand disappeared into smoothness. She found it very
upsetting.”
The hallway is quiet, the afternoon light fading to grey. Holly sits alone
in the classroom, sipping a cup of Darjeeling tea. She shakes off the hurry of
the day, and searches her mind for the sort of peaceful resolve she needs,
before she can begin to imagine tomorrow’s lesson. She opens the big desk
drawer and removes the book she is currently reading. A few quiet mo-
ments pass, and she begins to feel at home. Foucault, she is surprised to
read, offers a sympathetic account of Socrates. He argues that Socrates dic-
tum was not “know thyself”, but rather “care of oneself”. Foucault suggests
that Socrates words have been massively misunderstood, his message ob-
scured because of the Enlightenment and its obsession with epistemology.
She reflects on the arrogant command “know thyself” and the prescriptive
maxim, “the unexamined life is not worth living”.
Was it, she wonders, more accurately, “the untold life is not worth liv-
ing?” (Kearney, 2002, p. 156).
Ambiguous Closure
Holly’s story locates the opposition between narrative and philosophy
within her lived experiences of gender. Her memories of reading “earnest
and prudent” Plato in high school trace her own enactment of a gendered
obedience, later re-enacted by the “all female and highly obedient student
population” where she teaches. Although Nietzsche’s misogyny might have
been reason enough for her to reject him as a teenager, it was his emotional
rants and his angry disruption of the status quo, that were the very things
she later drew on in her pedagogy of discomfort.
The public lecture on Socratic irony demonstrates Holly’s ongoing am-
bivalent relation to philosophy. On the one hand, she is moved to trust her
intuitions, critique the textbook, and become self-consciously hermeneutic,
but on the other hand, she slips into the role of “the consummate good
student” and banishes irony (and perhaps also ambiguity) from her read-
ing of Socrates. It is only when we learn more about Holly’s past experi-
ences as a philosophy graduate student that we begin to trace the emer-
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gence of a critical perspective. Her desire to understand Wittgenstein as a
sexual and historical person, while she sits amongst men in an analytic phi-
losophy graduate course, “highly conscious of her singularity and her dis-
ruption of sameness” shapes her later pleasure at sharing Wittgenstein an-
ecdotes with her own students. Similarly, her “intimacy” with Foucault is
experienced on the grass, under a tree, outside the ivy-covered academic
building, grounded in the particularity of her exclusion from philosophy.
When her own student recounts the story of the “slave boy” experiment,
describing the disappearance of the lines drawn in the sand, and the tears
shed by the little girl at the resulting “smoothness”, the reader recognizes
the intense risk and emotional labor involved in encountering the univer-
sal. As Cavarero (2000) suggests, the philosophical notion of the universal
is both disturbed by and disturbing of the particular uniqueness of a per-
sonal narrative (p. 53). But it is the telling of this incident in class, the shar-
ing of the emotion, the awareness that a caring relation overruns the quest
for knowledge and certainty, and the opening up of a space for resistance
that together seems most disruptive and most promising in the tentative
closing of Holly’s story.
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